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Context: Heightened moral sensitivity seems to char-
acterize patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD). Recent advances in social cognitive neurosci-
ence suggest that a compelling relationship may exist be-
tween this disorder-relevant processing bias and the func-
tional activity of brain regions implicated in OCD.
Objective: To test the hypothesis that patients with OCD
demonstrate an increased response of relevant ventro-
medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex regions in a
functional magnetic resonance imaging study of diffi-
cult moral decision making.
Design: Case-control cross-sectional study.
Setting: Hospital referral OCD unit and magnetic reso-
nance imaging facility.
Participants: Seventy-three patients with OCD (42 men
and 31 women) and 73 control participants matched for
age, sex, and education level.
Main Outcome Measures: Functional magnetic
resonance imaging activation maps representing signifi-
cant changes in blood oxygenation level–dependent
signal in response to 24 hypothetical moral dilemma vs
nondilemma task vignettes and additional activation
maps representing significant linear associations be-
tween patients’ brain responses and symptom severity
ratings.
Results: In both groups, moral dilemma led to robust ac-
tivation of frontal and temporoparietal brain regions. Sup-
porting predictions, patients with OCD demonstrated sig-
nificantly increased activation of the ventral frontal cortex,
particularly of the medial orbitofrontal cortex. In addi-
tion, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left middle
temporal gyrus were more robustly activated in patients
with OCD. These results were unexplained by group
differences in comorbid affective symptoms. Patients’
global illness severity predicted the relative magnitude of
orbitofrontal-striatal activation. The severity of “harm/
checking” symptoms and “sexual/religious” obsessions
predicted the magnitude of posterior temporal and amyg-
dala-paralimbic activation, respectively.
Conclusions: The neural correlates of moral sensitivity
in patients with OCD partly coincide with brain regions
that are of general interest to pathophysiologic models
of this disorder. In particular, these findings suggest that
the orbitofrontal cortex together with the left dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex may be relevant for understand-
ing the link between neurobiological processes and cer-
tain maladaptive cognitions in OCD.
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E ARLY PSYCHODYNAMIC THEO-ries posited a link betweenobsessive-compulsive dis-order (OCD) and height-ened moral sensitivity that
has become again relevant in contempo-
rary cognitive behavioral models.1,2 Moral
sensitivity, for example, is intimately re-
lated to responsibility beliefs, which have
been argued to be a primary cognitive bias
in patients with OCD.3,4 According to this
view, an inflated sense of personal respon-
sibility provoked by the harmful and im-
moral nature of common intrusive
thoughts, images, or impulses leads to
compulsive behaviors, such as checking,
in an attempt to neutralize or prevent nega-
tive outcomes. Moral thought-action fu-
sion is a related concept that is instead
linked to misappraisals about the impor-
tance of one’s thoughts, whereby the mere
occurrence of intrusions is perceived as the
moral equivalent of deliberately acting on
them.5 In both cases, compulsions are seen,
in part, as direct attempts to reduce feel-
ings of moral violation that arise from these
maladaptive beliefs.2,4,5
Although cognitive behavioral models
have traditionally been considered dis-
tinct from neurobiological accounts of
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OCD, with one seeking to explain obsessions and com-
pulsions in terms of learned cognitive biases2 and the other
in terms of brain pathophysiological alterations,6 there
nevertheless exists potential for overlap.7 We highlight
recent developments in the social cognitive neurosci-
ence of human moral cognition, which has implicated
brain regions, such as the ventromedial prefrontal and
orbitofrontal cortices, as being critical to the experience
of moral emotions, such as guilt and shame.8,9 In par-
ticular, functional imaging studies of healthy individu-
als consistently report activation of these regions, to-
gether with adjacent prefrontal, cingulate, and lateral
temporoparietal regions—the so-called moral cognition
network—in tasks that provoke moral emotions.10-14 These
findings have been corroborated by recent studies15,16 of
adult patients with ventromedial prefrontal and orbito-
frontal cortex lesions, which show such patients to be
less emotionally reactive to certain moral dilemmas and
more likely to endorse moral violations despite intact
moral reasoning.
Regarding OCD, there exists strong evidence17-20 to
implicate these ventral frontal cortex regions in the dis-
order’s pathophysiology. For example, differences in
orbitofrontal cortex structure and function have been con-
sistently identified in neuroimaging studies of patients
with OCD, often representing part of a broader pattern
of frontostriatal brain changes. On the basis of func-
tional neuroimaging studies in particular, orbitofrontal
cortex activity seems to be increased under resting-state
conditions in patients with OCD21-25 and accentuated dur-
ing symptom provocation and the urge to ritualize.26-29
Although such findings do not generalize to all imaging
study contexts,30,31 increased orbitofrontal cortex activ-
ity seems to be most indicative of a patient’s sympto-
matic state compared with changes in other brain re-
gions.18,20,32
In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance
imaging and a novel moral dilemma task to examine the
putative neurobiological correlates of heightened moral
sensitivity in patients with OCD. In keeping with an
emerging neuroscientific view of human moral cogni-
tion, we hypothesized that the experience of moral di-
lemma in patients with OCD would provoke signifi-
cantly increased activation of the ventromedial prefrontal
and orbitofrontal cortex regions compared with healthy
participants. To induce moral dilemmas that ostensibly
overlap with OCD-relevant cognitive biases, such as re-
sponsibility beliefs, most task vignettes required partici-
pants to make difficult decisions about life and death trade-
offs that contrast utilitarian values of collective welfare
against the emotionally aversive act of causing harm to
others. Compared with nondilemma task vignettes, these
moral dilemmas lead to robust activation of key regions
of the moral cognition network.10,33,34 Accordingly, in ad-
dition to the ventral frontal cortex, we sought to exam-
ine potential differences in other task-relevant regions
between the 2 groups and whether direct relationships
might exist between the severity of obsessive-
compulsive symptoms and such brain responses. To sat-
isfy this latter aim, we recruited a sufficiently large group
of patients with OCD to support a detailed assessment
of major symptom dimensions.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-three outpatients with OCD were recruited from the
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders Unit of the University Hos-
pital of Bellvitge, Barcelona, Spain. Patients were selected from
a slightly larger cohort after having satisfied DSM-IV diagnos-
tic criteria for OCD in the absence of relevant medical, neuro-
logic, and other major psychiatric illness as well as neuroim-
aging data quality control checks (see “Image Acquistion and
Preprocessing” subsection). Diagnosis of OCD was indepen-
dently confirmed by 2 senior psychiatrists (P.A. and C.S.)
through separate interviews conducted 1 month apart using the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders.35 All
the patients had experienced OCD symptoms for at least 1 year
before this assessment. No patient met the criteria for Tou-
rette syndrome, any psychotic disorder, or psychoactive drug
abuse/dependence. Comorbid major depression and anxiety dis-
orders were not considered to be exclusion criteria provided
that OCD was the primary clinical diagnosis. All the patients
were taking stable doses of medication during at least a 3-month
period coinciding with the time of scanning, except 2 patients
who were medication free for at least 1 month (Table 1).
Patients with OCD (42 men and 31 women; mean [SD] age,
33.1 [8.3] years; age range, 19-58 years) had a mean (SD) edu-
cational level of 12.9 (2.8) years (range, 5-19 years), and all
but 9 were right handed (7 left handed and 2 ambidextrous)
as assessed by the Edinburgh Inventory.36 Seventy-three con-
trols were matched to the patients for age, sex, and total years
of education. Controls (42 men and 31 women; mean [SD] age,
32.6 [10.3] years; age range, 19-61 years) had a mean (SD) edu-
cational level of 13.1 (3.3) years (range, 8-22 years), and all
but 6 were right handed (4 left handed and 2 ambidextrous).
Each control underwent the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV nonpatient version37 to exclude any Axis I or II psy-
chiatric disorders. None of them had a personal history of neu-
rologic or psychiatric illness.
The Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS)38 and
the validated Spanish version of the Dimensional Y-BOCS
(DY-BOCS)39,40 were used to evaluate the presence and sever-
ity of patients’ symptoms (Table 1). Given the strong positive
correlation between the DY-BOCS total severity score and the
Y-BOCS total score (Pearson r=0.89, P .001), the former was
used in subsequent brain behavior analyses. Comorbid depres-
sion and anxiety symptoms were measured using the Hamil-
ton Depression Rating Scale41 and the Hamilton Anxiety Rat-
ing Scale,42 with missing data existing for 1 control and 1 patient
with OCD. Mean (SD) scores on both scales were significantly
more pronounced in patients with OCD (Hamilton Depres-
sion Rating Scale: patients, 10.0 [5.4] [range, 0-22]; controls,
1.0 [2.3] [range, 0-13]; F1,142=164.4, P .001; Hamilton Anxi-
ety Rating Scale: patients, 12.5 [6.5] [range, 2-30]; controls,
2.1 [3.3] [range, 0-17]; F1,142=145.6, P .001). All the partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided
written informed consent to participate in this study after re-
ceiving a complete description of its protocol, which was ap-




Twenty-four standard hypothetical moral dilemmas were
adapted into short vignettes for this study. Most of the chosen
dilemmas represent provocative “personal” moral dilemmas as
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described by Greene et al.10 These dilemmas are considered the
most emotionally engaging because they prompt one to en-
dorse actions that directly imply serious bodily harm to a vic-
tim or set of victims in which utilitarian values (ie, sacrificing
one to save many) violate typical moral-social (ie, deonto-
logic) standards, for example, “do no harm to others.” Each of
the 24 text vignettes was accompanied by an artist-sketched
illustration that depicted the core theme of each moral di-
lemma. Twenty-four nondilemma story vignettes were also de-
veloped as an imaging baseline condition for the moral dilem-
mas. Figure 1 presents an example of each vignette type. The




Within 1 week of scanning, participants were familiarized in
detail with the moral dilemma and control vignettes. This train-
ing session lasted approximately 1 hour and ensured that par-
ticipants had a clear understanding of the task and would be
able to recall each vignette on the scanning day. During this
session, the artist-sketched illustrations of the moral dilemma
and nondilemma vignettes were presented, together with a full
examiner-read description of each vignette. For this session,
the moral dilemmas were described as events involving an imagi-
nary third person (“Mr Jones”), and in no instances were par-
ticipants required to provide their own moral judgment.
On the day of the experiment before scanning, participants
verified that they could remember each of the individual vi-
gnettes. For the nondilemma condition, participants were told
to simply recall the correct outcome of each scenario when voice
prompted for a “yes/no” response by raising either their index
finger (yes) or index and middle fingers (no). For the moral
dilemma condition, participants were informed that during scan-
ning they would be asked to provide their own moral judg-
ment to each of the dilemma vignettes in response to an audio
prompt, again by raising their index finger (yes) or index and
middle fingers (no). Vignette-specific audio prompts were pre-
recorded and programmed to occur 1 second after the visual
presentation of each vignette (for a written description of each
prompt refer to the author’s website as stated earlier). The total
stimulus interval for each visual stimulus was 5 seconds. Par-
ticipants’ responses were made within a 4-second window using
the response commands described previously herein, which were
recorded by an examiner. The nondilemma and moral di-
lemma scenarios were presented as 430-second alternating
blocks of 6 stimulus presentations per block, lasting 4 min-
utes total. The task was programmed in Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral Systems Inc) and was presented using mag-
netic resonance imaging–compatible high-resolution goggles
and headphones (VisuaStim Digital System; Resonance Tech-
nology Inc).
To confirm that participants experienced the moral di-
lemma condition as more emotionally provocative than the non-
dilemma condition, they completed postscan ratings of their
overall experience of negative emotion during each task con-
dition using a scale from 0% (not at all) to 100% (extremely):
“How much did the [moral dilemma or simple] questions make
Table 1. Clinical Characteristics of 73 Patients With OCD
Variable Value
Age at onset of OCD, mean (SD) [range], y 21.8 (7.9) [5-40]
Duration of illness, mean (SD) [range], y 11.5 (9.5) [1-45]







DY-BOCS score, mean (SD) [range]a
1. Contamination/cleaning 4.0 (4.6) [0-15]
2. Harm/checking 5.7 (4.3) [0-12]
3. Sexual/religious 1.8 (3.5) [0-12]
4. Symmetry/ordering 3.2 (4.6) [0-15]
5. Hoarding 1.5 (2.8) [0-12]
6. Miscellaneous 2.5 (3.7) [0-12]
Total symptom severity, mean (SD) [range] 9.3 (2.3) [4-15]
Current level of impairment, mean
(SD) [range]
9.3 (2.4) [6-15]
Comorbid mood/anxiety disorders, No. (%)
Major depressive disorder 5 (7)
Dysthymic disorder 2 (3)
Bipolar disorder 1 (1)
Generalized anxiety disorder 3 (4)
Panic disorder 4 (5)
Social phobia 4 (5)
Medication at time of study, No. (%)
Medication free (4 wk) 2 (3)
Citalopram 2 (3)
Clomipramine 7 (10)
Clomipramine with an SSRI 29 (40)
Escitalopram 8 (11)
Fluoxetine 9 (12)
Fluoxetine with an SSRI 1 (1)
Fluvoxamine 3 (4)
Fluvoxamine with an SSRI 3 (4)
Phenelzine 1 (1)
Sertraline 1 (1)
Sertraline with an SSRI 1 (1)
With an adjunct antipsychotic agent 15 (21)
Abbreviations: DY-BOCS, Dimensional Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive
Scale; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; SSRI, selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitor; Y-BOCS, Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale
(1. contamination obsessions and cleaning compulsions; 2. obsessions
about harm due to aggression/injury/violence/natural disasters, and related
compulsions; 3. obsessions concerning sexual/moral/religious issues and
related compulsions; 4. obsessions about symmetry/“just-right” perceptions,
and compulsions to count or order/arrange; 5. obsessions and compulsions
related to hoarding; and 6. obsessions and compulsions that include somatic
concerns, need to know/remember, and superstitions, among other
symptoms).
aPossible score range, 0 to 15.
A B
Figure 1. Examples of a moral dilemma and a nondilemma task vignette.
A, The “crying baby” moral dilemma. Before scanning, participants were
familiarized with the moral dilemma of Mr Jones, who is faced with either
suffocating his young child to prevent his or her cries or risking his
neighbor’s and his own death at the hands of enemy soldiers. During
scanning, the illustration was again presented, and participants were asked,
“Would you remove your hand?” B, One of the nondilemma vignettes. Before
scanning, participants were familiarized with the story of Mr Jones, who
must decide whether to spend his weekend in a beautiful mountain town or
by the seaside. They were told that he ultimately decides on the latter. During
scanning, the illustration was again presented and participants were asked,
“Will he go to the beach?” Participants’ responses to the nonmoral
dilemmas, therefore, served as a general indicator of participants’ ability to
recall the task vignettes on the scanning day.
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you feel negative emotions, for instance, guilt, sadness, or
shame?” In addition, participants’ percentage accuracy in re-
sponding to the nondilemma task vignettes and the percent-
age likelihood that they endorsed moral violations (ie, in ac-
cord with utilitarian values or that would be considered to violate
typical moral standards) were also calculated. These data were
compared between groups by either 1-way or repeated-
measures analysis of variance using PASW Statistics 18.0 (SPSS
Inc). Task response data were missing for 2 patients with OCD,
and subjective emotion ratings were missing for 1 control and
1 patient with OCD. Pearson 2 analysis was used to compare
group differences in yes/no responses to each of the 24 indi-
vidual moral dilemmas.
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
Image Acquisition and Preprocessing
A 1.5-T Signa Excite system (General Electric) equipped with
an 8-channel phased-array head coil and single-shot echopla-
nar imaging software was used. The functional sequence con-
sisted of gradient recalled acquisition in the steady state (rep-
etition time, 2000 milliseconds; echo time, 50 milliseconds; and
pulse angle, 90°) in a 24-cm field of view, with a 6464-pixel
matrix and a section thickness of 4 mm (interslice gap, 1 mm).
Twenty-two interleaved sections, parallel to the anterior-
posterior commissure line, were acquired to generate whole-
brain volumes, which corresponded to 120 volumes for the moral
dilemma task, excluding 4 initial dummy volumes.
Imaging data were transferred and processed using a Micro-
soft Windows platform running MATLAB version 7 (The Math-
Works, Inc). Preprocessing was performed using statistical para-
metric mapping software (SPM5; Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging) and involved motion correction, spatial normal-
ization, and smoothing using a gaussian filter (full-width at half
maximum, 8 mm). Regarding motion correction, translation and
rotation estimates (x, y, z) were less than 2 mm or 2°, respec-
tively, for all the participants. Data were normalized to the stan-
dard statistical parametric mapping–echoplanar imaging tem-
plate and were resectioned to 2-mm isotropic resolution in
Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate space.
Image Analysis
For each participant, a primary task regressor was created by
convolving the onset of each moral dilemma block with a ca-
nonical hemodynamic response function and its temporal de-
rivative. The nondilemma condition served as an implicit task
baseline. Maximum likelihood parameter estimates were cal-
culated at each voxel using the general linear model and an AR(1)
model of serial autocorrelations. A high-pass filter was used to
remove low-frequency noise (1/128 Hz).
Contrast images for each participant were carried forward
to the group level using the summary statistics approach to ran-
dom-effects analyses. A 2-sample t test design was used to es-
timate significant within- and between-group activation ef-
fects. Within-group statistical parametric maps were thresholded
using a familywise error rate correction of PFWE .05 across the
whole-brain volume with a minimum cluster extent of 10 con-
tiguous voxels (KE, 10 voxels). Between-group statistical com-
parisons proceeded in 2 stages: (1) a small volume–corrected
comparison of hypothesized regions of interest and (2) a whole-
brain comparison of additional task-activated regions. For the
hypothesis-based comparison, between-group statistical para-
metric maps were thresholded at PFWE .05 (KE, 10 voxels),
corrected for a mask volume that encompassed primary moral
cognition network regions, as consistently identified in func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging studies of healthy partici-
pants.10-14 It included the ventromedial prefrontal and medial
orbitofrontal cortices, anterior and posterior cingulate corti-
ces, and lateral temporoparietal cortex. This mask was de-
fined bilaterally using the WFU_PickAtlas43 (Wake Forest
University School of Medicine) and had a total search volume
of approximately 15 000 voxels (eFigure 1; http://www
.archgenpsychiatry.com). For the whole-brain analysis, between-
group statistical parametric maps were thresholded at P .001
(uncorrected; KE, 10 voxels).
BRAIN-BEHAVIOR ASSOCIATIONS
A 2-sample t test design specifying covariates and interactions
was used to estimate associations between participants’ overall
tendency to endorse moral violations and corresponding brain
activation. For patients, associations between DY-BOCS ratings
of total symptom severity and current level of symptom-related
impairment and brain activations were estimated in a 1-sample
t test design. A 1-sample t test design was also used to test for
associations between DY-BOCS severity ratings on the 6 major
symptom dimensions and patients’ brain activations. All of the
previously mentioned associations were tested at P .001 (un-
corrected; KE, 10 voxels) across the whole-brain volume.
RESULTS
TASK RESPONSES
The moral dilemma condition was rated as significantly
more emotionally provocative (mean [SD]: patients, 60.4%
[30.4%]; controls, 69.4% [28.3%]) than the nondi-
lemma condition (mean [SD]: patients, 7.6% [14.0%];
controls, 7.6% [14.3%]), as indicated by a significant main
effect of condition (F1,142=453.0, P .001) but no main
effect of group or group  condition interaction.
The frequency with which participants endorsed moral
violations to the moral dilemma vignettes ranged from 7%
to 95%, with 10 vignettes recording approximately 50%
yes/no responses (eTable 1). No significant difference was
noted between patients with OCD (mean [SD], 24.6%
[9.1%]; range, 10.4%-47.9%) and controls (mean [SD],
25.9% [8.4%]; range, 10.4%-43.7%) in their overall ten-
dency to endorse moral violations in response to the moral
dilemmas (F1,142=0.81, P=.37). Both groups responded ac-
curately to the nondilemma task vignettes (mean [SD]: pa-
tients, 80.0% [12%]; controls, 84.3% [11%]), with con-
trols performing slightly more accurately than patients with
OCD (F1,142=4.85, P .03). The percentage of omitted re-
sponses to both task conditions was minimal (1.0%) and
did not differ between groups (eTable 1). When compar-
ing group responses to each of the individual moral di-
lemma vignettes, the groups differed in their proportion
of yes/no responses to only 5 of the 24 vignettes (2 P=.02-
.005) (eTable 1).
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
Brain Activation During Moral Dilemma
Responding to the moral dilemma vs nondilemma vi-
gnettes evoked robust and overlapping activation of dis-
tributed cortical and subcortical regions in patients with
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OCD and controls that recapitulates the results of many
previous studies of moral decision making.8,9,44 Acti-
vated regions included a large expanse of the medial fron-
tal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, ventrolateral and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, and lateral temporo-
parietal cortex, including the inferior parietal and pos-
terior superior temporal cortices, the caudate nucleus,
and the visual and visual association cortices (eFigure 2
and Table 2).
When comparing the groups in the hypothesis-based
analysis, there were no identified regions of signifi-
cantly greater activation in controls compared with
patients with OCD. On the other hand, patients exhib-
ited significantly more pronounced activation of a large
region extending from the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex to the orbitofrontal cortex (x, y, z=4, 38, –20;
z score=3.86; KE=870) and the left lateral temporal cor-
tex (x, y, z=–58, –36, –12; z score=4.08; KE=706). The
ventromedial-to-orbitofrontal cluster extended from the
cingulate gyrus to the rectal and orbital gyri in both hemi-
spheres. The lateral temporal cortex cluster extended
across the posterior portions of the middle temporal gy-
rus and superior temporal sulcus (Figure 2).
Further whole-brain comparisons did not identify any
regions of significantly greater activation in controls com-
pared with patients with OCD. However, this analysis fur-
Table 2. Within-Group Activation Results Associated With the Moral Dilemma Task
Area
Peak Anatomic Coordinate Statistics
x y z KE z Score
Controls
Posterior cingulate cortex 0 −58 34 12 439 8
Dorsal prefrontal cortex −12 54 32 12 058 8
Inferior parietal cortex −46 −62 24 1757 8
Inferior temporal cortex −64 −12 −26 1474 8
Inferior frontal cortex 38 28 −22 299 6.95
Superior temporal cortex 64 −10 −8 181 6.09
Hippocampus −20 −22 −20 101 5.97
Fusiform gyrus 62 −8 −32 260 5.92
Mid-cingulate cortex 0 −20 34 63 5.41
Thalamus −2 −8 6 80 5.35
Caudate −12 8 10 20 4.70
Patients With OCD
Posterior cingulate cortex 0 −58 34 3163 8
Inferior parietal cortex −48 −62 28 29 488 8
Inferior temporal cortex 60 −12 −34 490 7.54
Inferior frontal cortex 50 32 −16 448 7.22
Orbitofrontal cortex −2 58 −22 122 5.80
Medial temporal cortex 68 −14 −10 118 5.63
Mid-cingulate cortex −2 −22 36 66 5.59
Superior temporal cortex 50 −28 2 46 4.91
Caudate −14 10 10 37 4.70
Abbreviations: KE, cluster extent, in voxels, corresponding to a whole-brain threshold of PFWE  .05; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder.
–4 –16
t = 3 t = 6
+7
Figure 2. Regions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and left posterior middle temporal gyrus that were significantly increased in
activation during moral dilemma in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Small volume–corrected results are displayed at PFWE .05 (minimum cluster
extent of 10 contiguous voxels). Imaging results are displayed in neurologic format (right=right).
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ther identified a region of significantly greater activa-
tion in patients with OCD located in the left posterior
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (x, y, z=–40, 10, 24;
z score=3.66; KE=560) (Figure 3).
Because patients with OCD scored significantly higher
on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale and the Ham-
ilton Anxiety Rating Scale compared with controls, we
repeated the previous group analyses after covarying for
these rating scores. Results shown in eFigure 3 illus-
trate that the brain regions identified as significantly in-
creased in activation in patients with OCD remained when
specifically controlling for group differences in comor-
bid affective symptoms.
Brain-Behavior Associations
Across groups, the likelihood that participants en-
dorsed moral violations was found to be negatively as-
sociated with activation of the dorsal medial and lateral
prefrontal cortices, rostral anterior cingulate cortex and
posterior cingulate cortex, inferior parietal and poste-
rior temporal cortices, caudate nucleus, medial dorsal
thalamus, and globus pallidus (eTable 2 and eFigure 4).
No significant differences in the strength of these asso-
ciations were found to discriminate patients with OCD
from controls. No significant positive associations with
this behavioral measure were observed.
We observed only significant positive associations be-
tween patients’ DY-BOCS ratings of total symptom se-
verity and activation of the right caudate nucleus, mid-
orbitofrontal cortex, hypothalamus, left posterior temporal
cortex, and dorsal medial frontal cortex (eFigure 5 and
eTable 3). Of the 6 major DY-BOCS symptom dimen-
sions, severity ratings on the harm/checking and sexual/
religious dimensions demonstrated significant positive
associations with patients’ brain activations. Greater se-
verity of harm/checking symptoms was associated with
greater activation of the right posterior temporal cortex,
whereas greater severity of sexual/religious obsessions was
associated with greater activation of the left anterior in-
sular cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, left dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex, right amygdala, and dorsal an-
terior cingulate cortex (eFigure 6 and eTable 3).
COMMENT
Although there was considerable overlap in the brain re-
sponse to moral dilemma between patients with OCD and
controls, there were also significant differences be-
tween the 2 groups. Overall, the nature of these differ-
ences seems to support the moral sensitivity hypothesis
of OCD and suggests an intriguing putative connection
between neurobiological processes and certain maladap-
tive cognitions in this disorder.
Consistent with predictions, the moral dilemma task
provoked greater activation of the ventromedial prefron-
tal and orbitofrontal cortex regions in patients with OCD.
This is an intuitive finding considering historical and con-
temporary accounts of patients with OCD being “hyper-
moral” and recent neuroscientific evidence linking these
brain regions to the experience of moral emotions, such
as guilt and shame.15,16,45-47 One view is that the medial
orbitofrontal cortex, in particular, may influence such
emotions by encoding the relative value and salience of
environmental stimuli in support of complex decision
making and anticipation about future outcomes.48,49 The
greater engagement of these regions in patients with OCD
may, therefore, represent greater perceived salience of the
emotive dilemma stimuli or excessive valuation of deci-
+10
t = 3 t = 6
+24
Figure 3. Region of the left posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex that demonstrated significantly increased activation during moral dilemma in patients with
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Whole-brain uncorrected results are displayed at P .001 (minimum cluster extent of 10 contiguous voxels). Imaging results are
displayed in neurologic format (right=right).
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sion outcomes. Despite rating the moral dilemmas as sig-
nificantly more emotionally provocative than the non-
dilemma condition, patients did not rate them as more
provocative than did healthy participants. Thus, al-
though this assessment was not specific to particular moral
emotions or sentiments, it nevertheless suggests some dis-
tinction between patients’ increased ventral frontal cor-
tex response and their perceived experience of emotion
during moral dilemma.
With reference to the additional regions that distin-
guished patients with OCD from healthy participants, it
is possible that the moral dilemma task provoked other
disorder-relevant processes consistent with the moral sen-
sitivity hypothesis. Recent studies50-52 in healthy partici-
pants have shown that the explicit cognitive appraisal of
emotional stimuli, including negative appraisals, consis-
tently leads to increased activation of the left dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex and posterior middle temporal gy-
rus, the same regions implicated in patients with OCD.
For example, in one study,52 activation of these regions
was prominent when healthy participants were in-
structed to upregulate negative emotions by con-
sciously reappraising visual emotional images to be more
personally salient in terms of their subjective relevance.
The left hemispheric predominance of this finding was
attributed to the idea that such appraisals draw heavily
on affective descriptors and verbal narratives to regulate
emotion. In patients with OCD, it is plausible that dis-
order-relevant cognitive biases engaged during moral
decision making, such as greater perceived responsibil-
ity, might evoke heightened activation of these same left
frontotemporal regions. If true, the neural correlates of
moral sensitivity in OCD would, therefore, seem to equally
implicate brain regions associated with the conscious cog-
nitive appraisal of emotional stimuli and those more di-
rectly associated with the subjective experience of moral
emotions. The extent to which such processes might in-
teract or be dissociable in patients with OCD is not pres-
ently clear.
The 2 groups were not different in their activation of
other task-relevant cortical regions, including the dor-
sal medial frontal, inferior parietal, posterior cingulate,
and rostral anterior cingulate cortices. As discussed in
previous work,34,53 each of these regions has become con-
sidered to represent part of the “default mode net-
work,” a large-scale brain system that has become asso-
ciated with self-referential cognition in neuroimaging
studies.54 Thus, aside from the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, whose “default” activity has been linked princi-
pally with memory-based self-related cognition,55 de-
fault mode regions were comparably activated in pa-
tients with OCD. Irrespective of group membership,
individual differences in the willingness to endorse moral
violations were found to be negatively correlated with ac-
tivation of these regions. Greater difficulty in endorsing
moral violations may, therefore, have been experienced
as generally more self-engaging.
We recruited a large group of patients with OCD for
this work, which afforded the possibility to assess rela-
tionships between brain activations and clinical symp-
toms. To this end, greater overall symptom severity was
found to predict the activation of several task-related and
task-unrelated regions as defined at the group imaging
level. In the former case, this included the dorsal medial
frontal cortex and left posterior temporal sulcus, and in
the latter case, this included the hypothalamus, ventral cau-
date nucleus, and mid-orbitofrontal cortex. In previous
functional imaging studies,22,23,56,57 OCD symptom sever-
ity has been most consistently associated with elevated ac-
tivity of the orbitofrontal cortex and striatum, which is,
therefore, relevant to observe herein. Moreover, both of
these regions remain centrally implicated in pathophysi-
ologic models that implicate primary disturbances of or-
bitofrontal-striatal circuits to this disorder.17-19,21 There-
fore, as a function of illness severity, the moral dilemma
task seems to have engaged regions considered, in part,
to represent the primary “OCD circuit.”
Regarding correlations with specific OCD symptom
dimensions, these were limited to the severity of harm/
checking symptoms and sexual/religious obsessions.
Harm/checking symptoms, in particular, predicted greater
activation of the right posterior superior temporal sul-
cus, which is a region typically activated by tasks of ab-
stract visual social cognition, including moral decision
making.8,44 On the other hand, the severity of sexual/
religious obsessions predicted increased activation of more
distributed regions, including the amygdala, anterior in-
sular and dorsal anterior cingulate cortices, and lateral
orbitofrontal cortex. Of these regions, the amygdala was
not robustly activated by the task at the group imaging
level. Considering the anatomy of these limbic-
paralimbic regions and their link to emotional-
autonomic states,58 it is conceivable that patients scor-
ing high on this symptom dimension felt more challenged
or provoked by the moral dilemmas. Indeed, it is gener-
ally assumed that a strong link exists between moral sen-
sitivity in OCD and the experience of sexual and reli-
gious obsessions. Moreover, on the basis of cognitive bias
models of OCD, it may be suspected that these associa-
tions were specifically mediated or modulated by com-
mon dysfunctional belief domains, such as inflated re-
sponsibility.2,59
There are limitations to this study. First, we at-
tempted to maximize the emotionally provocative na-
ture of the moral dilemmas by using a simple mode of
decision making during task performance; for discus-
sion, see the study by Harrison et al.34 This choice came
at the cost of acquiring detailed online subjective rat-
ings of each of the dilemma vignettes and specific mea-
surements of decision latency, as implemented in other
past imaging studies of moral dilemma. However, based
on accumulated evidence in other clinical cohorts and a
recent behavioral study of moral reasoning in OCD, it
was generally not anticipated that patients with OCD
would exhibit pronounced deficits in moral decision mak-
ing per se.15,60-62 Second, this study would likely have ben-
efited from the inclusion of additional assessments, such
as the 44-item Obsessive Belief Questionnaire,63 which
is a validated measure of obsessional beliefs for use in
clinical and nonclinical populations. Such a measure
would have permitted direct exploration of the influ-
ence of inflated responsibility vs other belief domains on
the imaging findings. Third, since all but 2 patients in
this study were receiving medication at the time of as-
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sessment (primarily selective serotonin reuptake inhibi-
tor–based antidepressant treatment), we could not com-
pare medicated and unmedicated subgroups. Although
on the basis of several previous studies,22,25,56,64-66 it can
be argued that the influence of such treatments on brain
activation in OCD may have been to attenuate rather than
inflate this study’s results; this account is not definitive.
Such evidence does not address the fact that patients with
OCD receiving a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor
often receive other adjunct treatments, as was the case
in the present sample, and that the combined effect of
such treatment on brain functional activity is mostly un-
explored. The issue of medication use, therefore, repre-
sents a caveat to this study that will need to be ad-
dressed in future work. Fourth, despite the large patient
cohort and evaluation of OCD symptom dimensions, com-
parisons with another psychiatric cohort would have en-
hanced the specificity of these findings.
The previous limitations considered, this study pro-
vided a novel characterization of brain regions that poten-
tially represent an important link between neurobiologi-
cal processes and certain maladaptive cognitions in patients
with OCD. One broader implication of this work may be
to inform more advanced models of the etiology of obses-
sions and compulsions with the capacity to integrate dis-
tinct measurements across cognitive and biological do-
mains. Indeed, initial efforts to this end67 seem to endorse
a view that such “biopsychosocial” models will have the
greatest potential impact for improving the future under-
standing and treatment of OCD.2,6,7 However, to establish
firmer links among neurobiological processes, dysfunc-
tional beliefs, and clinical symptom dimensions, new re-
search must endeavor to assess causality between these mea-
surements. Such research may take the form of longitudinal
studies68,69 or specific experimental manipulations70 ca-
pable of prospectively testing causal predictions between
cognitive and neurobiological factors and the emergence
of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and behaviors.
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